：Endogenous Prominence and Consumer Confusion

Speaker：Yiquan Gu（University of Liverpool, Reader）

Host：HOU Chenxue, Assistant Professor, Lingnan College

Time and Date：14:30-17:00, Jan. 7, 2022

Venue: Wang Daohan Conference Room，Lingnan Hall

Language: English +Chinese

Abstract:

We study the relationship between strategic obfuscation and endogenous prominence in a duopoly. The firms make investments which determine their relative prominence, prior to competing in price frames and then in prices. Both frame differentiation and frame complexity may lead to consumer confusion. The equilibrium pattern depends on the interplay between the levels of prominence and consumer confusion. Prominence obtains endogenously and, for a wide range of parameters, there is maximal obfuscation in any pure-strategy equilibrium of the prominence game. Consumer protection which reduces the share of confused consumers might benefit both the consumers and the firms.

 Profile of the speaker:

Dr Yiquan Gu is Reader in Economics at the University of Liverpool Management School. Yiquan is a specialist in Industrial Economics and Game Theoretical modelling, with a particular focus on firm strategy, market efficiency and competition policy in the digital age. He has published a wide array of academic papers in leading journals in industrial economics as well as internationally reputable interdisciplinary outlets. Yiquan has conducted research for a wide range of funders including the Economic and Social Research Council, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, and charitable organizations..