Optimal subsidy beneficiaries to promote electric vehicle adoption

发布人:匿名 发布日期:2023-11-09阅读次数:88

SpeakerFeng Bo , Professor, Dean of the School of Business , Suzhou University

HostZeng Yan , Professor, Lingnan College

Time and Date15:00, Oct. 19, 2023

VenueWong Ping-Lay Conference Room, Lingnan Hall (203) 

Language: English + Chinese

 

Abstract

Electric vehicles (EVs) are increasingly approved as a disruptive technology that can limit oil consumption and reduce carbon emissions. Recognizing this, governments worldwide are continuously offering subsidies to promote EV adoption. However, the issue of identifying optimal beneficiaries remains inadequately addressed due to some critical though unexplored aspects. One of the conspicuously missing aspects is whether channel structures make a difference in selecting optimal beneficiaries. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to explore whom to subsidize (i.e., consumers, manufacturers, or both) to better realize the intended objectives  under vayring distribution channels of EVs (from retail channels to direct channels). Our analysis reveals that optimal beneficiaries to reduce consumer expenditure are largely affected by the channel structure while relying on the manufacturers R&D efficiency and consumersexpectation for government subsidy. We also extend our analysis to show that when beneficiaries are well-selected, the direct channel, in most cases, outperforms the retail channel in terms of consumer expenditure and manufacturers R&D level. As such, our analysis provides governors with advanced guidelines to select subsidy beneficiaries and compelling evidence to encourage direct selling.