微观经济与数字经济教研室学术讲座

报告题目：Buying Votes to Maximize the Potential
报  告 人：陈德麟（南方科技大学商学院 助理教授）
主  持 人：李学恒（中山大学岭南学院 助理教授）
时      间：2025年11月5日 （周三） 14: 30
地      址：岭南堂林植宣会议室（103）
语      言：英文

摘要:
      A vote buyer simultaneously offers voters personalized bribes asking them to vote for a proposal that is against their interests under general voting rules. Multiple equilibria typically arise: Either all voters or any maximal losing coalition accept their bribes and vote for the proposal. I show that this stylized vote-buying game is a potential game, and therefore a well-justified equilibrium selection criterion, potential maximization, is applicable. Under potential maximization, the buyer’s set of optimal bribes is the aspiration core of the dual simple game, concepts that are well studied in cooperative game theory. For constant-sum weighted voting rules, the buyer optimally bribes all voters with bribes proportional to their number of votes. My analysis provides a non-cooperative foundation for (a modification of) the aspiration core as a power index.

报告人介绍：

       陈德麟（Lester T. Chan）博士，现任南方科技大学商学院助理教授。他于波士顿大学获得经济学博士学位。陈教授的主要研究领域为微观经济理论和产业组织。他的学术成果丰硕，已在Management Science，The RAND Journal of Economics和Theoretical Economics等众多国际顶尖经济学与管理学期刊上发表独作论文多篇。此外，陈教授长期为Econometrica，Management Science，RAND Journal of Economics，Games and Economic Behavior，International Journal of Industrial Organization等权威学术期刊担任审稿人。

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