第596期岭南学术论坛（经济学系列Seminar）

报告题目：Security-bid Auctions with Information Acquisition

报  告 人：李昱楠（香港城市大学，助理教授）

主  持 人：徐欣毅（中山大学岭南学院，助理教授）

时      间： 2021年12月10日（周五）14:30-17:30

地      点：MBA楼902

语      言： 中文+英文

点击链接入会，或添加至会议列表：https://meeting.tencent.com/dm/p8vcQRZtpPxg

#腾讯会议：930-211-550，会议密码：211210

摘要:

We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities whose payments are contingent on the asset’s realized value and can covertly acquire information at some cost before participating in an auction. We first consider auctions with ordered securities in which the seller restricts the security design to an ordered set and uses a first- or second-price auction. We show that steeper securities give agents lower marginal returns to information and may yield lower revenues. We then study linear mechanisms in which payments linearly depend on the asset's realized value. We show that the revenue-maximizing linear mechanism assigns the asset efficiently. The winner pays in cash if their expected values are above a threshold and pays in stock if their expected values are below the threshold. The threshold decreases as the marginal cost of acquiring additional information increases. This result implies that stock payments are associated with lower merge synergies and lower information acquisition costs. We empirically test the implications and find consistent results.

报告人介绍：

Yunan Li is currently Assistant Professor at City University of Hong Kong. Prof. Li obtained her PhD in Economics from University of Pennsylvania in 2017. The main research interests of Prof. Li are Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Auction Theory, Contract Theory, Information Economics. Her research has been published in peer-reviewed journals including Theoretical Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, and Games and Economic Behavior.

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        中山大学岭南学术论坛分经济、金融和管理三个系列，是定期邀请国内外优秀学者前来开展学术交流的平台。每系列每个月定期举办2-3次。目前已经成功举办多期，并得到了各界的高度评价。