微观经济与数字经济教研室学术讲座

报告题目：Data-Driven Hold-up and Relational Contracts
报  告 人：陆卓然（上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院 助理教授）
主  持 人：李学恒（中山大学岭南学院 助理教授）
时      间：2025年11月18日 （周二） 14: 30
地      址：伍沾德堂岭南行政中心214会议室
语      言：中文

摘要:
      This paper studies how relational contracts can mitigate hold-up problems between platforms and online sellers when platforms exploit their data advantage to compete against sellers. In each period, a seller decides whether to remain on a platform and how much to invest in product innovation, which depreciates without continued investment from the seller. The platform then decides whether to copy the seller’s product. If it does, both compete; otherwise, they share the monopoly profit. We show that when products depreciate relatively fast, the optimal relational contract is stationary and efficient under sufficiently high discount factors. In contrast, when depreciation is slow, the platform always copies the seller under high discount factors, whereas cooperation can be sustained at intermediate levels. The efficiency of the relational contract depends critically on the seller’s outside option and the depreciation factor. The outside option has discontinuous and nonmonotonic effects on efficiency, implying that higher outside options may not benefit online sellers. Moreover, the depreciation factor can have opposing effects on efficiency, depending on whether the platform copies the seller when the relational contract is breached.

报告人介绍： 

       陆卓然老师为上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院助理教授，研究兴趣包括契约理论、信息经济学、组织经济学、网络经济学和数字经济。他近期研究包括信号商品的最优定价、团队工作中基于网络的同伴监督设计，以及关系契约在数字经济中的作用等问题。陆教授已有多项成果发表于Journal of Economic Theory和MIS Quarterly等经济管理国际顶级学术期刊。

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