微观经济与数字经济教研室学术讲座

报告题目：How the design of cartel fines affects prices: Evidence from the lab
报  告 人：Sander Onderstal（阿姆斯特丹大学 经济学教授）
主  持 人：杨扬（中山大学岭南学院 副教授）
时      间：2024年1月7日（周二）下午14:30
地      点：岭南堂伍沾德会议室204
语      言：英文

摘要：
        Competition authorities impose substantial penalties on firms that participate in illegal horizontal price-fixing agreements. We investigate how basing cartel fines on either revenue, profit, or price overcharge influences cartel and market prices, as well as cartel incidence and stability. In an infinitely repeated Bertrand oligopoly game, we show that revenue bases incentivize firms to increase prices above the monopoly price, while only overcharge bases incentivize price reductions. Cartels are stable for a smaller range of discount factors when fines are based on overcharges than on other bases. We test these predictions in a laboratory experiment where subjects can opt into cartels, which allows them to discuss pricing at the risk of being detected and fined. We equalize excepted fines across treatments so that our results originate in the base of the fine, not the size of the fine. Variation in market prices across treatments is determined by cartel prices, which follow the theoretical predictions, but cartel incidence is equal across fining regimes. Our results suggest benefits from authorities moving away from revenue bases towards profit or overcharge bases.

报告人简介：

       Sander Onderstal是阿姆斯特丹大学的经济学教授，他的研究方向包括拍卖、产业组织和实验经济学。教授在多个国际期刊上发表过研究成果，包括Journal of Political Economy、Journal of Public Economics、International Economic Review、European Economic Review 和 Games and Economic Behavior。教授曾为一些政府部门、公共机构和私营企业提供关于房地产、加油站和移动通信频谱拍卖方面的咨询服务。

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