理论微观经济学研讨会（第一期）
时 间：2026年11月21日（星期六）9: 00 – 12: 00
地 点：MBA大楼 702室
主持人：徐欣毅（中山大学岭南学院 副教授）
语 言：中英文
本次研讨会聚焦理论微观经济学的前沿议题，围绕契约理论、机制设计、市场匹配、信息与激励等研究展开交流。研讨会包括以下三场高水平学术报告。
报告主题1：The Fragile Promise: Job Security and Contract Design under Partial Commitment
报 告 人：戴亮（香港中文大学（深圳） 助理教授）
报告时间：9: 00 – 9: 55
摘 要：
We develop a continuous-time moral hazard model with partial commitment, where a principal can alter contracts at random opportunities. Their arrival rate reflects commitment power. Commitment power matters differently depending on whether diligence or misconduct is more observable. For guardian jobs, where misconduct is easier to observe, the optimal contract is static and permanent, with fixed diligence bonuses, and is unaffected by weaker commitment. For entrepreneurial jobs, where diligence is easier to observe, optimal contracts feature probation, promotion bonuses, and renewed probation after each alteration opportunity. Weaker commitment raises bonuses, shortens probation, accelerates bonus declines, and can sometimes improve welfare.
简 介：
戴亮，现任香港中文大学（深圳）经管学院助理教授，主要研究方向为微观经济学理论和金融学。于2009年在香港大学获得经济金融学一级荣誉学士学位，于2015年在美国普林斯顿大学获得经济学博士学位。2015—2023年任教于上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院，先后任助理教授、副教授，2023年10月至今任香港中文大学（深圳）经管学院助理教授。研究成果发表于Journal of Economic Theory、Review of Financial Studies等国际一流期刊，主持国家自然科学基金面上项目。
报告主题 2： Incentivizing Knowledge Transfers
报 告 人：邝仲弘（中国人民大学 副教授）
报告时间：10: 00 – 10: 55
摘 要：
We study the optimal design of relational contracts that incentivize an expert to share specialized knowledge with a novice. While the expert fears that a more knowledgeable novice may later erode his future rents, a third-party principal is willing to allocate her resources to facilitate knowledge transfer. In the unique profit-maximizing contract between the principal and the expert, the expert is asked to train the novice as much as possible, for free, in the initial period; knowledge transfers then proceed gradually and perpetually, while the principal offers lump-sum compensations to the expert right after verifying each transfer; even in the long run, a complete knowledge transfer might not be attainable. Our analysis sheds light on the success of several prominent cross-border technology transfers that took place in China's auto industry and Korea's high-speed rail development.
简 介：
邝仲弘，中国人民大学经济学院副教授，中国运筹学会博弈论分会副秘书长、青工委副主任。2015年和2020年分别于清华大学获得学士学位和博士学位，毕业后至今就职于中国人民大学经济学院。研究方向是微观经济理论和数字经济，重点关注竞赛设计和信息设计，研究成果发表在Journal of Economic Theory和Games and Economic Behavior（2篇）等国际期刊上，主持国家自然科学基金面上项目和青年项目，担任中国信息经济学会理事、CCF计算经济学专业委员会执行委员和多个UTD24期刊的审稿人。担任数字经济系列教材《平台经济学》的副主编。作为导师所指导的本科生曾获吴玉章奖学金（中国人民大学学生最高荣誉）。
报告主题3：Less is More: Early Participation and Welfare in Sequential Matching
报 告 人：李梦玲（厦门大学 教授）
报告时间：11:00 – 11:55
摘 要：
We study how early participation affects welfare in sequential matching markets when agents are uncertain about their competitiveness. Early admission generates two opposing forces. It improves sorting by allocating positions to highly competitive agents, but early outcomes also reveal information that shapes subsequent application behavior. We show that unfavorable early outcomes induce agents to strategically compromise toward safer, less-preferred options in the regular stage. This learning-induced compromising effect dominates the sorting benefit, so non-binding early admission weakly increases mismatch and reduces welfare. We then study binding early admission, under which early offers must be accepted. Commitment changes agents’ incentives to acquire information and attenuates learning-induced compromising, resulting in weakly lower mismatch than under non-binding early admission. A laboratory experiment supports the central mechanism that early admission increases compromising, leading to greater mismatch and lower student welfare.
简 介：
李梦玲，厦门大学经济学院、王亚南经济研究院教授、博士生导师，入选国家级青年人才计划。研究聚焦于市场机制设计、行为与实验经济学，成果发表于Theoretical Economics、Journal of Economic Theory、Management Science、Games and Economic Behavior等国际顶尖期刊。主持国家自然科学基金等项目，曾获Social Choice and Welfare Prize等多项学术荣誉。
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