岭南学术论坛-经济学系列Seminar-Simultaneous Signaling in Elimination Contests
第589期岭南学术论坛(经济学系列Seminar)
报告题目:Simultaneous Signaling in Elimination Contests
报 告 人:王汝渠 (浙江大学经济学院,教授)
主 持 人:焦倩(中山大学岭南学院,副教授)
时 间:2021年11月5日(周五)下午 14:30-17:00
地 点:岭南堂汪道涵会议室
语 言:英文+中文
Abstract:
In this paper, the signaling effect of bids (efforts) in a two-round elimination contest is analyzed. Bids in the first round are observed by all players and can signal players' private information which is useful in the second round bidding. When the second round contest sensitivity is higher than a cutoff, there exists no completely separating equilibrium; when it is lower than the cutoff, then under some regularity conditions, the equilibrium is completely separating. Comparing to the benchmark model where private information automatically becomes common knowledge right before the start of the second round, strong players would over-bid and weak players would under-bid; the presence of the signaling effect causes the first round bidding function steeper for high valuations and flatter for low valuations.
报告人简介:
王汝渠,浙江大学经济学院教授。毕业于美国波士顿大学经济系,现为加拿大皇后大学经济系约翰·麦克唐纳爵士终身教授。他长期致力于拍卖理论、博弈论方面的研究,并运用博弈论方法对各种拍卖机制进行深入的分析,在政府和公司的采购行为中如何通过设计更好的机制以获取效率和收益等方面作出了重要的贡献,他的研究成果曾发表在American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Economic Journal, Journal of Labor Economics, Games and Economic Behavior等世界顶级经济学杂志,在国际学术界引起广泛关注,是一位在国际经济学界有重要影响的华人经济学家。
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