岭南学术论坛－经济学系列Seminar－Does External Monitoring from Government Improve the Performance of State-Owned Enterprises?

岭南学术交流会（经济学系）

报告题目：Does External Monitoring from Government Improve the Performance of State-Owned Enterprises?

报  告 人：张红松（香港大学 助理教授）

主  持 人：侯晨雪（中山大学岭南学院 助理教授）

时      间：2019年12月20日（周五）上午 10：00-11：30

地      点：岭南堂汪道涵会议室

语      言：中文+英文

Abstract:

This paper investigates how external monitoring from government influences the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), by affecting managerial expropriation in procurement (proxied by input prices) and shirking in production management (proxied by productivity). Because firm-level input prices are usually not observed, we apply a structural approach of production function estimation to estimate them together with firm-level productivity, providing a methodologically practical approach to overcome the common data limitation. Using a nationwide policy shock in China that strengthened government monitoring on SOEs exclusively, we find enhancing monitoring can substantially improve SOEs' input prices and productivity. Moreover, as spatial-dimension evidence, higher monitoring costs increase input prices paid by SOEs and reduce productivity. Such negative effect is largely alleviated by the monitoring-strengthening policy. The results suggest that government monitoring can be an effective policy instrument to improve SOE performance.

报告人介绍：

      张红松，香港大学经济及工商管理学院助理教授，于2013年毕业于宾夕法尼亚州立大学，获得经济学博士学位。他的主要研究领域为产业经济学，国际贸易和中国经济。研究成果见于Journal of Development Economics, International Economic Review等国际顶尖期刊。

欢迎师生参加！