岭南学术论坛－经济学系列Seminar－Commitment Design

岭南学术交流会（经济学系）

报告题目：Commitment Design

报 告 人：熊思阳  (Professor of Economics, University of Bristol)

时      间：2019年5月17日（周五）下午2:30—4:00

地      点：岭南堂林植宣会议室

语      言： 英文 + 中文

Abstract：

A simple model of commitment design is proposed, or equivalently, we rigorously introduce a new paradigm (i.e., commitment design) for economic design problems, besides the two current paradigms (i.e., the classical mechanism design and information design). Furthermore, we prove that Pareto efficiency can always be achieved via a commitment protocol. This is in sharp contrast to previous results in the literature, e.g., the impossibility result in Arieli, Babichenko, and Tennenholtz (2017) and the folk theorem in Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet (2010).

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