岭南学术论坛－金融学系列Seminar－Exaggerating to Break-Even: Reference-Dependent Moral Hazard in Auto Insurance Claims

第517期岭南学术论坛（金融学系列Seminar）

报告题目：Exaggerating to Break-Even: Reference-Dependent Moral Hazard in Auto Insurance Claims

报 告 人：Jaimie Lien（香港中文大学 助理教授）

主 持 人：戴芸（中山大学岭南学院 助理教授）

时     间： 2018年11月23日（周五）下午16:00-17:30

地     点：岭南堂林植宣会议室

语    言： 中文+英文

Abstract：

The effects of asymmetric information are often difficult to detect empirically, such as in insurance settings (Chiappori, Jullien, Salanie and Salanie, 2006). We show that allowing for the possibility of reference-dependent preferences can assist with this challenge. Using detailed auto insurance claims data and adopting the methodology of Allen, DeChow, Pope and Wu (forthcoming) which studies reference-dependence in marathon finishing times, we show that policy holders exaggerate their damage claims in a manner consistent with reference-dependent moral hazard with the original premium as a reference point. Consistent with our theoretical model of reference-dependent moral hazard, we find greater tendencies to recover the premium amount in the second half of the coverage year compared to the first half, and stronger effects among policyholders’ first claims compared to subsequent claims. The reference-dependent effect is stronger among policyholders with higher premium levels and those deemed low risk by the insurance company, and is concentrated among more expensive cars and older cars. We do not find robust patterns in the concentration of insurance claims at round number percentages less than the full premium amount, such as 90% or 80%, nor at percentages greater than the premium amount such as 110%. This implies that the unnatural claim behavior is motivated significantly by reference-dependence around the original premium rather than merely wanting to increase one’s claims more generally. Since the claims can only be this precisely manipulated by the policy holder after an accident, the findings can be attributed specifically to ex-post moral hazard but not adverse selection or ex-ante moral hazard. Our study illustrates the potential of behavioral economics frameworks in assisting with identification challenges for classical economic problems.

报告人介绍：

        Jaimie Wei-Hung Lien，香港中文大学商学院助理教授。2001年获得美国卫尔斯利女子学院经济数学学士学位，2005年获得美国加利福尼亚大学圣地亚哥分校经济硕士学位，2010年获得美国加利福尼亚大学圣地亚哥分校经济博士学位。研究领域包括行为经济学、实验经济学、应用微观经济学。目前已有论文发表于Nature Communications、PNAS、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、Experimental Economics等国际期刊。2016年被中国信息经济学会授予"中国信息经济学2016青年创新奖"和"中国信息经济学2011-2015理论贡献奖"。

个人网页：https://www.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk/staff/lien-jaimie/

        欢迎感兴趣的年轻老师和博士生参加！

        中山大学岭南学术论坛分经济、金融和管理三个系列，是定期邀请国内外优秀学者前来开展学术交流的平台。每系列每个月定期举办2-3次。目前已经成功举办多期，并得到了各界的高度评价。