岭南学术论坛－经济学系列Seminar－Too big to prevail: Coalition formation in the presence of a superpower

第508期岭南学术论坛（经济学系列Seminar）

报告题目：Too big to prevail: Coalition formation in the presence of a superpower

主 讲 人：Changxia Ke（Queensland University of Technology，Senior Lecturer）

主 持 人：才国伟（中山大学岭南学院 教授）

时     间：2018年10月26日（周五）下午 14:30-16:00

地     点：岭南堂汪道涵会议室

摘要:

In this study we investigate the effect of players' power on the formation of coalitions to divide a prize when the assumption that coalition formation involves binding agreements on how to split the prize is relaxed. In our experimental setup with one powerful (`strong') player and three standard (`weak') players, we vary the strong player’s voting rights in one dimension and manipulate the timing of agreement and communication on the prize division in the other dimension (i.e., whether binding agreement on prize division and furthermore whether non-binding communication on prize-split intentions at the stage of coalition formation is available). We predict and find: first, with binding agreement, the results of the game and the players’ average payoff are closely in line with the relative power of the players as measured by their Shapley value. Second, when binding agreement on the division of the prize is not possible at the stage of coalition formation stage, the strong player's likelihood to be part of the winning coalition and his average payoff stays high if he is not ``too strong'' but it decreases significantly if his voting rights increases further. Third, interestingly, (cheap-talk) communication at the coalition formation stage hurts the strong players if they are too powerful. By and large, the experimental results show the importance of binding agreements for powerful players' coalition formation capacity.

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