​报告题目：Optimal subsidy beneficiaries to promote electric vehicle adoption

报 告 人：冯博（苏州大学商学院教授、院长，国家重大人才工程特聘教授，国家级人才项目获得者，国家重大人才工程青年项目入选者）

主 持 人：曾燕（中山大学岭南学院 教授）

时    间：2023年10月19日（周四）15:00

地    址：岭南堂黄炳礼会议室（203）

语    言：中英文

摘要:

Electric vehicles (EVs) are increasingly approved as a disruptive technology that can limit oil consumption and reduce carbon emissions. Recognizing this, governments worldwide are continuously offering subsidies to promote EV adoption. However, the issue of identifying optimal beneficiaries remains inadequately addressed due to some critical though unexplored aspects. One of the conspicuously missing aspects is whether channel structures make a difference in selecting optimal beneficiaries. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to explore whom to subsidize (i.e., consumers, manufacturers, or both) to better realize the intended objectives  under vayring distribution channels of EVs (from retail channels to direct channels). Our analysis reveals that optimal beneficiaries to reduce consumer expenditure are largely affected by the channel structure while relying on the manufacturer’s R&D efficiency and consumers’ expectation for government subsidy. We also extend our analysis to show that when beneficiaries are well-selected, the direct channel, in most cases, outperforms the retail channel in terms of consumer expenditure and manufacturer’s R&D level. As such, our analysis provides governors with advanced guidelines to select subsidy beneficiaries and compelling evidence to encourage direct selling.

报告人介绍：    

    冯博，苏州大学商学院院长、教授、博导。国家重大人才工程特聘教授，国家级人才项目获得者，国家重大人才工程青年项目入选者。兼任江苏省新时代民营经济研究院院长和东吴资本市场研究院院长，担任POM-China战略咨询委员会委员、中国管理科学与工程学会常务理事等多个学术任职。  

    活动由中山大学保险与金融工程教研室和中山大学金融工程与风险管理研究中心联合举办。       

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