讲座简介：

 Abstract：I propose a multiperiod matching model of firms and managers to

 explain that managerial career concerns may not guarantee economic

 efficiency in matching. In the model, firms compete for managerial talent,

 and managers are concerned about their reputations. Due to the trade-off

 between match efficiency from productive complementarity and agency costs

 from managers’ reputational concerns, assortative matching of firms and

 managers may fail. I derive necessary conditions for such failure with

 respect to the size distributions of firms. The model can be applied to

 analyzing cross-sectional patterns of two-sided matching, and aggregate

 firm performance and agency costs.

主讲人简介： 嘉宾简介：Eunhee Kim，香港城市大学助理教授，哥伦比亚大学运筹学硕士毕业，卡耐基梅隆大学会计学博士毕业，博士论文获得美国会计学会最佳论文奖。