报告题目：Inducing Supply Chain Transparency through Supplier Encroachment
报 告 人：关旭（华中科技大学 教授）
主 持 人：徐佳焱（中山大学岭南学院 助理教授）
时 间： 2019年5月24日（周五）下午4:10—5:40
地 点： 岭南堂汪道涵会议室
This paper investigates the supplier’s voluntary disclosure strategy when he can encroach on the retailer’s operations by selling directly to final consumers. The establishment of direct channel expands the market potential, induces the supplier to adopt disclosure strategy more frequently, and finally leads to a higher level of information transparency in the supply chain. Since more quality information is revealed in the presence of dual-channel, the retailer is able to free ride on the supplier’s disclosure to enhance the consumer’s quality expectation. In most cases, such a free-riding effect is positive and can even create a higher ex-ante payoff for the retailer in face of the supplier’s encroachment. Differently, more transparent quality information does not necessarily benefit the supplier, as the supplier can no longer hide those negative quality information to the consumers due to the change of channel structure. Thus, we show that the supplier’s ex-ante payoff may become lower with encroachment and the supplier would commit not to encroach on the retail market, even though he is endowing with a free option to open the direct selling channel.
Xu Gun is a Professor of Operations Management at School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology. He received his Ph.D. in Management Science from Huazhong University of Science and Technology. His main research interests include supply chain management, operation and marketing interface. He has published papers in Productions and Operations Management, Journal of Retailing, Naval Research Logistics, Decision Sciences and other academic journals.