报告题目：Knitting and Ironing: Reducing Inequalities via Auctions
报 告 人：Charles Z. Zheng (Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario)
主 持 人：焦倩（中山大学岭南学院 助理教授）
语 言： 英文 + 中文
This paper characterizes all the mechanisms that achieve ex ante Pareto optimality via voluntary wealth transfers induced by auctions. Two items, one good, the other bad, are to be assigned to bidders who value money differently, and the taker of the bad is compensated with proceeds from the good. Pareto-improving transfers occur indirectly when bidders who value money less buy the good, and those who value money more are paid to take the bad. We introduce a new concept, two-part operator, to integrate a bidder’s endogenously countervailing information rents, one in buying the good, the other in taking the bad. To solve the optimal mechanism problem, the objective of which is nonlinear, we bisect it into two linear programmings, solve each via ironing, and knit the two into the solution for the original problem. We find that any Pareto optimum corresponds to the concatenation of two auctions, each determined by a two-part operator derived from such procedures.